battle of khe sanh casualties battle of khe sanh casualties

[12], Following the closure of the base, a small force of Marines remained around Hill 689 carrying out mopping-up operations. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. Tolson was not happy with the assignment, since he believed that the best course of action, after Tet, was to use his division in an attack into the A Shau Valley. As a result of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 22 January 1968 by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. Its mission was to destroy the Special Forces and their Vietnamese allies and to ambush any reinforcements coming from Khe Sanh. The launching of the largest enemy offensive thus far in the conflict did not shift Westmoreland's focus away from Khe Sanh. The fighting was heavy. Journalist Richard Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear or chemical weapons might have to be used." See also Pisor, p. 108. [95], It still came as a shock to the Special Forces troopers at Lang Vei when 12 tanks attacked their camp. The pallet slid to a halt on the airstrip while the aircraft never had to actually land. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions. The Tet Offensive was about to begin. This base was to serve as the western anchor of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam known as I Corps. As far as PAVN casualties were concerned, 1,602 bodies were counted, seven prisoners were taken, and two soldiers defected to allied forces during the operation. [64], The main base was then subjected to an intense mortar and rocket barrage. "[168][Note 7], Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, the commander of the 3rd Marine Division, pointed out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. . "[28], As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all that he needed to know was that the PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus. [163] Other theories argued that the forces around Khe Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area or that they were serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the American invasion at Inchon during the Korean War. In response, US forces were built up before the PAVN isolated the Marine base. [98] The Marines continued to oppose the operation until Westmoreland actually had to issue an order to Cushman to allow the rescue operation to proceed. By early 1967, the Marine position was reinforced to regimental strength. [28], In early December 1967, the PAVN appointed Major General Tran Quy Hai as the local commander for the actions around Khe Sanh, with Le Quang Do as his political commissar. The Pegasus force consisted of the Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) plus the 1st Marine Regiment. A smaller slice of the action saw Americans on the receiving end, defending some firebase or outpost. [27][28] The Marines' defensive system stretched below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the coast, along Route 9, to Khe Sanh. The distinctions between Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II, while important from the command perspective, were not necessarily apparent to individual Marines. [164] He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there instead of dividing its forces. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway. During the course of the siege, the U.S. Air Force dropped five tons of bombs for each of the estimated 20,000 attacking NVA troops. What is the 25th Infantry known for? But only by checking my service record while writing this article did it become evident that I had participated in all three operations. server. Aug 23, 2013. [143][144], On 15 April, the 3rd Marine Division resumed responsibility for KSCB, Operation Pegasus ended, and Operation Scotland II began with the Marines seeking out the PAVN in the surrounding area. [165], Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. On 8 February 1971, the leading ARVN units marched along Route 9 into southern Laos while the US ground forces and advisers were prohibited from entering Laos. Throughout the battle, Marine artillerymen fired 158,891 mixed rounds. Strategically, however, the withdrawal meant little. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. The presence of the PAVN 1st Division prompted a 22-day battle there and had some of the most intense close-quarters fighting of the entire conflict. According to the official PAVN history, by December 1967 the North Vietnamese had in place, or within supporting distance: the 304th, 320th, 324th and 325th Infantry Divisions, the independent 270th infantry Regiment; five artillery regiments (the 16th, 45th, 84th, 204th, and 675th); three AAA regiments (the 208th, 214th, and 228th); four tank companies; one engineer regiment plus one independent engineer battalion; one signal battalion; and a number of local force units. Even so, Westmoreland insisted for it not only to be occupied by the Marines but also for it to be reinforced. Unlike the official figures, Stubbes database of Khe Sanh casualties includes verifiable names and dates of death. This article was written by Peter Brush and originally published in the June 2007 issue of Vietnam Magazine. [128] Also, Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak seconded the notion that there was never a serious intention to take the base by arguing that neither the water supply nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN. [128] They also reported 1,436 wounded before mid-March, of which 484 men returned to their units, while 396 were sent up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hospitals in the north. [137] Opposition from the North Vietnamese was light and the primary problem that hampered the advance was continual heavy morning cloud cover that slowed the pace of helicopter operations. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. [23][Note 2], James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By late January 1967, the 1/3 returned to Japan and was relieved by Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9 Marines). [24], The plateau camp was permanently manned by the US Marines in 1967, when they established an outpost next to the airstrip. In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. [21], PAVN artillery fell on the main base for the first time on 21 January. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. [61] To cover a defilade near the Rao Quan River, four companies from 2/26 were immediately sent out to occupy Hill 558, with another manning Hill 861A. The official North Vietnamese history claimed that 400 South Vietnamese troops had been killed and 253 captured. The most controversial statistic in Vietnam was the number of killed in action (KIA) claimed by each side. All of the attacks were conducted by regimental-size PAVN/VC units, but unlike most of the previous usual hit-and-run tactics, they were sustained and bloody affairs. [167], Another theory is that the actions around Khe Sanh and the other battles at the border were simply feints ands ruse meant to focus American attention and forces on the border. A Look at the Damage from the Secret War in Laos, How Operation Homecoming Was Sprung into Action to Repatriate American POWs, The Viet Cong Were Shooting Down Americans From a Cave Until This GI Stopped Them, https://www.historynet.com/recounting-the-casualties-at-the-deadly-battle-of-khe-sanh/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. At around 10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. The battalion was assaulted on the night of 23 January by three PAVN battalions supported by seven tanks. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. If only it had contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the Marines. Early in the war US forces had established a garrison at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri province, in the . The official assessment of the North Vietnamese Army dead is just over 1,600 killed, with two . Further information on the bombing campaign: Further information on the electronic sensor system: Westmoreland's plan to use nuclear weapons, President Johnson orders that the base be held at all costs, Operation Charlie: evacuation of the base. Only nine US battalions were available from Hue/Phu Bai northward. That did not mean, however, that battle was over. by John Prados. Two days later, US troops detected PAVN trenches running due north to within 25 m of the base perimeter. In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. Since the official duration of the battle ends even earlier than the termination of the siege itself, a wider definition of the Khe Sanh battlefield to include Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II also seems reasonable. Its main objectives were to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions. At 04:15 on 8 February under cover of fog and a mortar barrage, the PAVN penetrated the perimeter, overrunning most of the position and pushing the remaining 30 defenders into the southwestern portion of the defenses. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. Listen Now. The 26th Marine Regiment (26th Marines) is an inactivated infantry regiment of the United States Marine Corps. [93], The situation changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. [39], On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of an unknown size north of Hill 861. Stubbe examined the command chronologies of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 26th Marines, plus the after-action reports of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and more than one dozen other units, all present at Khe Sanh under 26th Marine operational control. It was not sufficient to simply be an American military person killed in the fighting there during the winter and spring of 1967-68. About two hours later, an NVA artillery barrage scored a hit on the main ammunition dump at Khe Sanh Combat Base, killing Lance Corp. Jerry Stenberg and other Marines. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement. But Pisor also pointed out that 205 is a completely false number. One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. It was later renamed "Dye Marker" by MACV in September 1967, just as the PAVN began the first phase of their offensive by launching attacks against Marine-held positions across the DMZ. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation. On the afternoon of 29 January, however, the 3rd Marine Division notified Khe Sanh that the truce had been cancelled. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled Victory at Khe Sanh, reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. [122], In late February, ground sensors detected the 66th Regiment, 304th Division preparing to mount an attack on the positions of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter. A myth has grown up around this incident. "[106] At the end of January, Tompkins had ordered that no Marine patrols proceed more than 500 meters from the Combat Base. 20,000-30,000 men Battle of Khe Sanh Overview Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. Westmoreland had been forwarding operational plans for an invasion of Laos since 1966. Battle of Khe Sanh: American Casualties : Showing All Results. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently. Just days before, as the Army of the . Rod Andrew, Jr., a history professor at Clemson University and colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, has written an easily read and thoroughly . [34] US intelligence estimated between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN troops were killed, and 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and ARVN Airborne elements were killed in action, but three of the four battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat-ineffective during the battle. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. Over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped by US aircraft and over 158,000 artillery rounds were fired in defense of the base. That was accomplished, but the casualties absorbed by the North Vietnamese seemed to negate any direct gains they might have obtained. [109], The resupply of the numerous, isolated hill outposts was fraught with the same difficulties and dangers. The assault began on 10 May 1969 w ith the 101st Airborne Division and troops of the 9th M arine Regiment, the 5 th Cavalry Regiment, and the 3 rd ARVN Regiment. [105], Lownds estimated that the logistical requirements of KSCB were 60 tons per day in mid-January and rose to 185 tons per day when all five battalions were in place. [22] The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, which were to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to protect the local population. The PAVN would try to take Khe Sanh, but if could not, it would occupy the attention of as many American and South Vietnamese forces in I Corps as it could, which would facilitate the Tet Offensive. Twenty-five USAF personnel who were killed are also not included. Only those killed in action during Operation Scotland, which began on November 1, 1967, and ended on March 31, 1968, were included in the official casualty count. The base was officially closed on July 5. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. [152] The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January - 9 April 1968) Max Hastings wrote a bestseller on Vietnam, and Dan met him to discuss Domino theory, whether it was possible for the US to win the war and the effect the war had on those who fought in it. The Siege of Khe Sanh. "[160] That has led other observers to conclude that the siege served a wider PAVN strategy by diverting 30,000 US troops away from the cities that were the main targets of the Tet Offensive. As a result, "B-52 Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of Vietnam in late March 1968. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. [25], In the winter of 1964, Khe Sanh became the location of a launch site for the highly-classified Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group. On April 5, 1968, MACV prepared an Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle for General Westmoreland. [15], Unknown (1,602 bodies were counted, US official public estimated 10,00015,000 KIA,[19][20] but MACV's secret report estimated 5,550 killed as of 31 March 1968)[1]. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. He made his final appearance in the story of Khe Sanh on 23 May, when his regimental sergeant major and he stood before President Johnson and were presented with a Presidential Unit Citation on behalf of the 26th Marines. The fire of PAVN antiaircraft units took its toll of helicopters that made the attempt. [127] At 08:00 the following day, Operation Scotland was officially terminated. Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. The combat losses in February and March 1967 were a prelude to the "First Battle of Khe Sanh," one of the Vietnam War's hardest-fought battles, . The fact that the North Vietnamese committed only about half of their available forces to the offensive (6070,000), most of whom were Viet Cong, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. Westmoreland echoed this judgment in his memoirs, and, using exactly the same figures, concluded that the North Vietnamese had suffered a most damaging and one-sided defeat. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. The last of the American casualties were finally lifted off Hill 861 on March 17. The Marines, whose aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. With Khe Sanh facing a full-scale. [140] Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. [62], On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected and laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. Battle of la Drang Valley (26 October - 27 . Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. The relief of Khe Sanh, called Operation Pegasus, began . Many American casualties were caused by the 10,908 rounds of rockets, artillery and mortars the North Vietnamese fired into the base and hill positions. [69] Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, KSCB was further reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". During this time, KSCB and the hilltop outposts around it were subjected to constant PAVN artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks, and several infantry assaults. [74], During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later renamed "Igloo White"), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos, were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. The border battles, however, had two significant consequences, which were unappreciated at the time. [81] The sensors were implanted by a special naval squadron, Observation Squadron Sixty-Seven (VO-67). He gave the order for US Marines to take up positions around Khe Sanh. [77] When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. This range overmatch was used by the PAVN to avoid counter-battery fire. "[149], While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 519 October 1968 with minimal opposition. Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment.